Funding for medical residencies has been capped by US Congress since the late 1997, and has resultantly become an increasingly limiting factor of the doctor supply in the US.
Introduction
Graduate Medical Education residency is the only route for practicing medicine in the United States. To become a licensed physician, one must complete some graduate training in an accredited USGME program, which is federally funded. Since the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, the number of Medicare funded residents has been capped at 100,000, which has arguably become the most significant constraint on the labor supply of doctors. In 2007, there were 106,012 residents and fellows in total training in programs accredited by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) Education residencies by 15,000 nationwide which would amount to a 15% increase overall.
The RPSR (S. 973) was one of the first bills to emerge throughout the healthcare overhaul period and was unexpectedly brought to the Senate floor by Senator Bill Nelson on 1 Salsberg et al. (2008) also notes that of those small documented increases in graduate medical education that have taken place since 1997 to fill the cap space, 44% of new residents are international medical graduates. Despite these inflows, according to American Association of Medical Colleges Reports, physicians per capita are falling to levels as low as 175 doctors per 100,000 in some states as a consequence of current residency policy.
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May 5th. An identical bill (H.R. 2251) was subsequently introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on the same day and on May 7th it was brought before the Subcommittee on Health.
Using an event-study approach, I assess both the impact on healthcare firm stock prices resulting from the introduction of the RPSR in May 2009 as well as the proposal of an amendment with the same residency provisions to a healthcare overhaul bill in December 2009.
During the surprise introduction to the bill, the average cumulative abnormal return between May 5th and May 7th was 10.9% percent for Managed Care sub-industry firms in the S&P 500 Index which corresponds to an increase in total market value of approximately $5.5 billion.
We believe that only managed care firms consistently demonstrate significant abnormal returns because it is the only healthcare sub-industry which incorporates substantive primary care physician fees in its cost schedules and hence is the sub-industry most exposed to tightness in the market for doctors.
The effects of health reform legislation on healthcare firm stock prices has been documented to show significant abnormal returns. Miller and Al-Ississ (2010) assess the impact of health reform, following the surprise election of Sen. Scott Brown, by conducting an event study using the stock prices of S&P Healthcare Index firms. Assuming that his election decreased the probability of passing the overhaul bill, they find that health reform decreased the value of managed care firms. This is something I use to keep in mind when assessing the impact on healthcare firm total equity values from amending one of the healthcare overhaul bills with the RPSR residency provisions, which takes place on Dec 4, 2009. To identify the impact of the amending the bill alone on healthcare company stocks, I use Intrade.com contract prices to verify that the amendment did not significantly change the probability of the larger bill passing, which would confound the observed changes in stock prices during the event period.
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In addition, during the amendment of the bill, the cumulative average abnormal return between December 4th and December 8th (spanning 3 trading days because of the intervening weekend) was 4.2% percent for Managed Care sub-industry firms in the S&P 500 Index which corresponds to an increase in total market value of approximately $2 billion.
The overall cost of the bill has been forcasted to be roughly on the scale of $10B over the next 10 years, and given the probability of the bill passing from the Intrade.com data along the amount of expected increased profits reflected in equity values from the event study implies roughly 27% of the cost savings get passed on to firms, while the remaining 73% is passed on to consumers.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the literature and the timeline of the legislative initiatives. Sections III presents the data and empirical strategy, and Section IV contains the results. Section V discusses regional effects of the doctor supply and Section VI concludes.
Literature and Theory
The literature on shortages in the doctor supply is rooted in work on labor market models which explore implications of deviations from equilibrium behavior. Friedman and Kuznets (1954) examine how medical school entry barriers imposed by the American Medical Association inflated doctor wages above equilibrium wages by 11%.
Following the reversal of American Medical Association policy actively restricting medical school seats to curb the number of practicing physicans at the end of the 1990's, medical residencies have become an increasingly more important factor in contributing to a potential doctor shortage (Salsberg et al., 2008) , particularly since the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which capped the number of Medicare funded residents has been at 100,000 per annum.
Perhaps not coincidentally, Roth (1984) famously developed his model of monopsony and labor matching while observing matching between medical residents and hospitals. Note the depression of surgeon wages in the late 1990s due to Medicare reforms. There is also the question of why real physician wages across all disciplines escalate in the late 2000s. Matched with documented decreases in the labor supply of physicians across the same period, we argue that this is a result of medical residency caps placed by Congress in the late 1990s.
If this is the case with MPL being non-zero, such a constraint creates inefficiencies for healthcare firms, who pay such wages at a level above equilibrium. Classical price theory dictates that in an imperfectly competitive market, an increase in long-run profits would result from an increase in the labor supply that would restore real physician wages back down toward equilibrium. In this paper, we measure the passthrough to managed care firms and consumers, as perceived by the stock market, from potential cap-alleviating policies. Other studies have examined the effects of Medicare policy on physician costs. Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008) look at the effect of Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) reform in switching from full cost reimbursement to parital cost reimbursement and the resulting increase in the relative price of medical labor.
To our knowledge, the effect on the total market value of healthcare firms via changes in physician costs or reimbursement resulting from a potential change in policy has received little empirical attention thus far.
To discern the implications for managed care firms, I adopt a classic event study methodology (Fama et. al, 1969) to assess the impact of a leglislative initiative, proposing to change the doctor supply, on healthcare industry stock prices.
Several previous studies have made it clear that exploring the effects of leglislative proposals are very conducive to such a type of analysis.
Jayachandran ( There is ample evidence that new information emanating from exogeneous changes to political platforms and especially tentative legislation can also have a direct impact on stock prices (Knight 2006 , Ferri 2008 We also verify this market sentiment and adjustment in our graphical analysis well before the event (Figure 2 ).
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The only other health related legislation occuring during the event period were two smaller amendments, one aimed at expediting a tax bridge to small businesses (S.A. 2007), and a vote to ban abortion coverage by hypothetical public plans which did no pass the Senate (S.A. 2962). We believe that these proposals are too small to have any significant impact on S&P Health Care stocks.
Senate Amendment 2909, vowing to expand medical residency programs, however, was withdrawn from the bill on December 19, during which time I would expect some negative abnormal returns. Therefore, I also dedicate some analysis to observing the magnitude of this fallout. Nonetheless, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was eventually passed in the Senate on December 22. After being passed in the House, it was signed into law on March 23, 2010.
I also refrain from considering the effects of both events together in my statistical analysis, for multiple reasons. Determining whether abnormal returns resulting from the two distinct events are serially correlated is difficult, especially since we find both effects to be positive. Since the two events are separated over several months, testing whether the null that covariance of stock price effects between the two events is zero is treacherously difficult. This is because whether the changes in market valuation for the first event did take into consideration that the probability of the second event (a later amendment with the same provisions) may have increased substantially due to the first event happening. In other words, the bill was introduced initially when it was unclear whether healthcare reform would later manifest in an overhaul bills that the market believes could later give shelter to the RPSR as an amendment should it have difficulties passing on its own. Thus, for simplicity, both events are considered independently. language offering a buy-in to medicare for those aged between 45 to 54, a tentative provision embodying a public option. Therefore, I use the Intrade.com probability as an estimate for the RPSR passing the Congress, and effectively compute the effect on producer surplus using both this probability together with the increase in market capitalization resulting from the bill, and its administrative costs.
I estimate the expected returns of each firms equity using the following market model:
Where R it is the daily rate of return of firm i on day t, and R mt is the benchmark measure of market returns at time t, which in our study is the S&P 500. it is the error term for company (i) during period t, where we assume that returns are normally distributed and,
Following the classic event study methodology (Fama et. al, 1969) , I estimate the market model (eq. 1) during the period beginning on the trading day prior to the first day of the event window extending back 1000 trading days. In another specification, I use a FamaFrench market model, regressing individual returns on market capitalization (SMB) and book-to-market value (HML), in addition to the market benchmark return.
With the resulting parameters, I extrapolate the expected return of the equities through the event window. Now I measure the Abnormal Return (AR) of healthcare industry stocks in response to the introduction of the legislation, as the difference between the actual returns for the equities during the event window and the fitted returns from the market model parameters.
The Average Abnormal Return is measured as the average return across the n-firm subindustry:
The Cumulative Average Abnormal Return is measured as the sum of the over the three-day event window:
With the above returns being computed for each period, I now use the following parametric and non-parametric tests, given various distributional assumptions:
1. Parametric Traditional Tests (Binder, 1998) In our traditional parametric tests we make the assumption that individual AR it 's are independently and identically distributed and that abnormal returns are normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ 2 .
We also make the assumption that the event has an effect on the mean only, or more simply that the standard deviation of abnormal returns are constant during the event period.
Using the null hypothesis for AAR t = 0, we can use the following test statistic:
Similarly with CAAR t , after computing its standard deviation from the estimate of the standard deviation of AAR t , we use the following test statistic:
2. Parametric Standardized Tests (Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen, 1991) In a slightly different case where, in addition to the mean, the standard deviation of returns changes from the estimation period to the event period, we use a different method to test for significance. We define Standardized Abnormal Returns (SAR) for each firm by dividing the firms return by its standard deviation. Each firm's standard deviation is measured from our data in the estimation period prior to the event.
Testing average abnormal returns in general can be done with the following test-statistic.
Similarly for average cumulative abnormal returns, we can use:
3. Nonparametric Sign Test (Cowan, 1992) I also use a non-parametric test that dispenses with distributional assumptions about abnormal returns. Instead I calculate,
where p(+) is the tendency for the firms to have postive returns during the 1000 trading day estimation period, pos is the number of positive returns during the three-day event period, and N is the number of firms in the sub-industry of interest. This statistic, by the Central Limit Theorem, should follow a normal distribution and can be used to test for significance as such.
Results
The Managed Care sub-industry demonstrated the most instances of positive and significant abnormal returns in both event periods (Tables 1 and 2 ). This S&P listed sub-industry includes the major insurance companies (Aetna, Cigna, Coventry Health Care, Humana, Unitedhealth Group, and WellPoint). Other sub-industries such as HC Facilities and HC Pharmaceuticals demonstrate a variety of positive and negative significant abnormal returns, possibly due to effects associated with their role as input providers for various managed care firms that are potentially gaining new medical residents creating more business. I elaborate on m ore on these latter effects when addressing other mechanisms not previously discussed that could be producing abnormal returns.
Introduction of the RPSR
The event study analysis shows positive and significant abnormal returns for Managed
Care companies on May 5th, 6th and 7th, the days following and including when the RPSR was introduced (Table 1) . Overall, we find a 10.2 percent cumulative abnormal return, corresponding to an increase in the market value of these firms of approximately $5.5 billion, over the event window. This is strong evidence that an exogenous initiative to add medical residencies and subsequently decrease primary care physician wages is a good thing for Managed Care industry.
We find no significant abnormal returns prior to the event window, which is just prior to when the bill was introduced which adds some credibility to the unexpectedness of information contained in the bill from the standpoint of the market, and the non-involvement of lobbyists in obtaining or distributing prior information (Figure 2a) . We also find a small drop in the middle of our event period (May 6), on which we think may have to do with waiting for the results of the bill's debate before the Subcommittee on Health, that will become broadly public on the following day (May 7). There is also a severe decrease in abnormal returns just following the end of our event window. On May 11, abnormal returns fall by -5.01 percent which is roughly equal to half of the previous total jump in abnormal returns following the release of the bill. We think this is likely because of the House Subcommittee on Health blocked the bill from going further in the legislative process, effectively halting the bill's momentum for the time being and diminishing some hope the healthcare sector had for additional residency programs that would cut physician costs.
Amendment of RPSR Provisions to the Overhaul Bill
When the RPSR provisions are proposed to be amended to the healthcare overhaul bill on December 4, we find positive and significant abnormal returns on Dec. 4, 7, and 8, ((all three days following when the amendment was brought to the floor) and an abnormal cumulative average return of 4.2 percent for the managed care sub-industry, which amounts to a total increase in market value of about $2 billion (Table 2) . Notably, I find that before the 5th I find a small downturn in equity values before the announcement of the amendment, which may or may not be a sign of lobbyist influence or other pessimism in healthcare markets (Figure 2b ).
We find that there are positive abnormal returns for the S&P Managed Care sub-industry on each day of the event period as well as cumulatively over the entire period that are significant at the 5% level or better, when using our traditional test. Our non-parametric test is significant at the 5 percent level as well, which again speaks to the rarity of such positive abnormal returns.
With a Fama-French specification as our market model, our abnormal returns are virtually identical, while their corresponding test statistics lose some significicance.
However, we did not find that the results were significant with the standardized test which suggests the possibility of heteroskedasticity present among the estimation and event windows. We do consider observations from a GARCH model which provides some obersvational results that do not lend much support to a heightened standard deviation during the event. However, due to the observational nature of the GARCH in the context of this study, this specification is not testable.
With respect to individual managed care companies, we find that most managed care firms had positive abnormal returns though are not significant because of the high volatitility of the individiual stocks (Table 3) . To insulate our results from information that could possibly contaminate the event study we chose tight three-day event periods, however, if
we relax this assumption, we notice a significant spike in Managed Care abnormal returns just two days after the end of our orignal event period (Figure 2 ). This assumption may be equally be valid due to the relative drought of other legislative and healthcare related news in this week and if so we would find positive average abnormal returns on December 10 of 3.98 percent for the sub-industry as a whole. Cumulatively if we widen our event period to five days to include this, we find significant cumulative abnormal returns for Aetna, United
Healthcare, and Wellpoint at the 5 percent level and Cigna at the 1 percent level.
In addition, we find that on the day that the amendment was dropped on December 19
that there was a small subseqent period of negative abnormal returns, however, these were statistically insignificant.
Other Mechanisms Affecting Returns
Overall, it can be gleaned that whenever a serious initiative to expand medical residency programs is unexpectedly raised, it appears to have a positive impact on expected future
Managed Care firm profits, notably those firms who pay primary care physicians as part of the firm's cost structure.
Taking into account that historically, minor increases in Medicare reimbursement rates typically accompany increases in Medicare residencies, this may lead to a slight upward bias in our results if analysts incorporate this tendency into their expectations, combined with the documented effect of Medicare reimbursement increases being negatively associated with the relative price of labor observed by Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008) . Nonetheless, this would only cause bias in the effect of adding the marginal resident on health care equity values, and not cause bias in the effect of decreased physician wages on the labor market for doctors which translate into reduced costs.
One other significant part of the RPSR, and most other related residency legislation, is how to redistribute pre-existing medical residency programs to augment the current allocation system, which distributes approximately 1-2 Medicare funded residencies per hospital location annually.
Asymmetries in cap redistribution may be a significant reason for why we observe oscillating positive and negative abnormal returns for Pharmaceutical and Facilties firms over the event period. While cap redistribution was debated in Congress, which hospital facility regions that get a positive bump in residencies may benefit the market value of pharmaceutical companies and facilities which serve those particular hospitals. As different information about the bills details emerge over the three day event period, and the effect of redistributed residencies gets calculated incorporated into analyst expectations, this may cause fluctuations in S&P HC Pharma and HC Facilities companies depending upon their regional coverage and whether residencies could be reallocated in their favor. As this was being debated between the 5th and the 7th, this could have easily had oscillating positive and negative effects on market value throughout the period. This may very well explain why the HC Pharma returns are negative on the May 6th (Day 2), positive on the May 7th (Day 3), and still significant on both days at least at the 5 percent level.
While some HC Facilities companies directly employ physicians, they predominantly employ specialists such as acute care doctors among whom there is a much lesser degree of shortage unlike primary care doctors, who are in large part reimbursed by third-party insurers or Medicare. This may also explain why we observe small and statistically insignificant abnormal returns with the HC Facilities sub-industry, in contrast with the HC Managed Care sub-industry.
Finally, when computing the surplus from the provisions of the bill passed on to consumers, I note that again from observing Figure 1 that the probability of the overhaul bill passing was not significantly changed by the proposed amendment of the RPSR. While the larger overhaul bill, if passed would be at a cost of around $800B over the following 10 years, the RPSR has a cost of $1.5B during the first year and subsequently following varying schedule over seven years at approximately cost of $10B. After the RPSR was presented as an amentment to the bill, the Intrade.com price stays at approximately 0.72, and given this 'predictive probability' of the RPSR passing and dividing our average cumulative abnormal return ($2.4B) for the Managed Care industry by this probability, we get that approximately 27 percent of the costs get passed onto firms. The remaining 73 percent is then passed onto consumers assuming no dead-weight loss.
This is a substantial assumption as it is likely that in addition to the surplus passed on to the consumer and producer, there is already surplus being lost to the doctors as well since they are not being paid an equilibrium wage in the labor market. Since this latter inefficiency is fairly difficult to measure for the purpose of this study, this 73 percent estimate simply
gives us an upper bound on the amount of surplus pased onto consumers resulting from the bill.
Ultimately there could be other possible reasons for why Managed Care firms show a positive response to proposals to increase the doctor shortage. For instance, the initiatives can be considered to be a human capital subsidy which the costs of which firms can then forego. Hence I use a state-by-state analysis to look further at whether firms with higher regional sentivities to doctor shortages experience a larger increase in their market valuation.
Regional Effects of Doctor Shortages
To reasonably flesh out the effect of low levels of the doctor supply on different regional healthcare markets faced by firms, I look at the average number of physicians per person a managed care firm typically faces.
To do this, I use a proxy of the state exposure to low levels of the doctor supply in a given state by using U.S. News and World Report Rankings of Managed Care Firms by market share in each state and multiplying it by the number of physicians per capita in each state.
Physicians per capita is a good measure of how tight the labor cost per patient (MC/patient) is in each state, as well as an idea of the severity of state-by-state doctor shortages, which is depicted in Figure 4 .
The healthcare firm rankings by market share are on a 1 to 10 scale, 1 being the highest and 10 being the lowest. Some S&P 500 listed managed care firms have little or no presence in particular states. Thus, it is sensible to use a covariate that is ascending in market value and gives a zero if the firm does not have a top 10 market share in the state. Therefore, I
18 estimate the following regression:
where, CAAR i is the cumulative average abnormal returns for firm i, Doctors(S) is the number of physicians in state S, and rank Si is the ranking of firm i's market share on a scale of 1 to 10 in state S and i is the idiosyncratic error.
With taking into account rankings, I find some evidence that our doctor per capitaregional market cap ranking interaction average is a significant and negative covariate in predicting the CAAR of the firms (Figure 3 ). This includes Aetna, Cigna, Coventry, Humana, and Wellpoint, but excludes United Healthcare due to its scattered rankings based upon its multiple within state subsidiaries which makes it hard to gauge what the market share rank is for the parent company in many individual states. To make up for the loss of a major managed care firm, I include Kaiser Permanente (KP) in our regional analysis which, though not listed on the S&P 500 Health Index, is a very large HMO and national managed care firm.
With the cross-state average doctor supplys each firm faces weighted by market share by state is significant at the 10% level and negatively correlated with the cumulative abnormal returns over the period with a R 2 of 0.369 (Figure 3 ). This would imply that firms with larger market shares in states with a greater shortage of doctors derive excess gains from expansionary residency policy. In other words, firms with large managed care market shares capture labor market tightness in states where there is a low number of doctors per capita.
Ultimately adding more Managed Care firms, not listed on the S&P 500 and applying the same analysis to other legislative initiaives involving medical residency expansion, or retraction, would be helpful in determining how to find more robust results from a regional analysis, which are grounds for future research. to expand the number of GME residencies by 15,000, was amended to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. These returns correspond to an increase in total market value of approximately $5.5 billion and $2 billion respectively. For identification purposes, I use data from an Intrade.com contract to ensure the credibility of the effect observed when the RPSR provision was amended to the overhaul bill, and was not due to changes in the probability of the rest of the overhaul bill passing rather than the RPSR becoming more likely to be passed into law. I also find that twice when the provisions of the RPSR were halted, either by the Subcommitee on Health or when the amendment was thrown out, that these same managed care firms immediately experience negative abnormal returns, which in one case was statisitically significant.
The paper also finds, using state-by-state market share ranking data and state doctor supplies per capita, that managed care companies that typically operate in states with a low number of doctors per capita experience an increase in market value to a greater extent in response to legislative iniatives seeking to increase the number of medical residencies. This observation is drawn from a weak, but significant negative correlation between CAAR and exposure to markets with low levels of doctors per capita.
Using the projected administrative costs, together with the increases in market value calculated in this study and the probabilities provided by the Intrade.com contract, I also compute the surplus passed onto producers and and estimate that passed on to consumers.
The overall cost of the bill has been forcasted to be approximately $10B, and given the probability of it being signed into law and the amount of expected increased profits reflected in equity prices from the event study, we find roughly 27% of the cost savings get passed on to firms while the remaining 73% is passed on to consumers or other inefficiencies. 
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The difference in the actual and expected returns using the estimated parameters is computed to get the abnormal returns, AR it = R it −α i −β i R mt . The associated test statistics are reported beneath. The standardized test statistic assumes that there is a different standard deviation of returns between the estimation and event periods. The nonparametric result is a simple non-parametric sign test consistent with the literature, that tests whether the number of positive returns is above the average amount of days with positive returns in the estimation period. With the Fama-French specification, I just report the results from the traditional test statistic, which are very similar to the results from the conventional market model used in the literature. I find that there are very positive responses for Managed Care firms on the third day of the event that across the entire event period, from introduction to consideration by the Subcommittee, the CAAR are positive and significant at the 5% level across all tests. December 5, 2009 , that would increase Graduate Medical Education residencies by 15%. AAR reports the average abnormal returns on a given day during the event period and CAAR reports the cumulative average abnormal returns. The abnormal returns are calculated by first estimating a market model to forecast returns R it = α i + β i R mt + it , or in our Fama-French specification
HM L mt + it . I then compute the difference in the actual returns and expected returns using our estimated parameters to get our abnormal returns, AR it = R it −α i −β i R mt . The associated test statistics are reported beneath, including those for the traditional and standardized tests. To the right are non-parametric test statistics. With the Fama-French specification, I just report the results from the traditional test statistic, which again tends to be very similar to the results from the conventional market model used in the literature. I find that there are positive abnormal returns for Managed Care firms on each day of the event period as well as cumulatively over the entire period that are significant at the 5% level or better. We also observe both positive and negative significant results for HC Pharma, HC Facilities and HC Equipment, which is likely due to their role in providing inputs to managed care firms which might have a heightened level of demand for such inputs given a forecast of additional residents. abnormal returns for each of the managed care firms during the introduction of the RPSR, that are calculated by differencing our actual and fitted returns from our market model R it = α i + β i R mt + it . AAR report the average abnormal return for each day in the event period, and CAAR report the cumulative average abnormal returns over the event period for each firm. Below them are the associated test statistics given by t = AAR/ σ i for AAR where σ i is the firm specific standard deviation of returns in the event window. Similarly the t-stat for CAAR is t = (1/T) * CAAR /(σ i )*(T-1)/T, where T is the number of days in the event period. We notice that most of the abnormal returns are concentrated around the final day of the event study when the bill was brought before the House Subcommittee on Health. In particular we find significant positive abnormal returns for Aetna, Cigna, Coventry and United Healthcare on the final day and cumulative returns significant for Aetna at the 5% level and for United at the 1% level. expand the number of medical residencies by 15%. The abnormal returns for each day (AAR) and across the three event days cumulatively (CAAR) are calculated using the market model and actual returns from the formulas in Table 1 . The CAAR** column reports the cumulative returns for each firm when we include an extra two days at the end of the event window. Their t-stats are reported directly beneath and have the same formulas as reported above. We find positive abnormal returns for every firm on the third day and cumulatively over the event period, however, we find that none of them are significant. Though our results are somewhat weaker for our individual firm analysis, when we include two extra days in our event window, we find positive and significant returns for Aetna, Unitedhealth, and Wellpoint all at the 5% level. We also defer to our industry-wide results for Managed Care firms reported in Table  2 that are positive and significant at the 5% level with respect to cumulative average abnormal returns. Price Predicted Probability
Event Window
Notes: This Intrade.com contract uses market data to measure the probability of the public option passing over time. This is useful in arguing that our identification assumption, that being the amendment did not change the probability of the existing healthcare overhaul bill from passing, which would otherwise confound our results with a secondary effect on healthcare equity prices observed in Miller and Al-Ississ (2010) . Since we observe very little change in the probability during the event period, this seems to be reasonable evidence that the identification assumption holds. Notes: Individual Abnormal Returns over time for each Managed Care company listed in the S&P Healthcare Index. We test for abnormal returns between May 5 and May 7; from when the Resident Physician Shortage Reduction Act was introduced until it was passed to its appropriate Subcommittee. We find positive and significant abnormal returns at during this period summing to an average of 10.2% for each firm. We also observe that the severe drop following May 8 may be due to the halting of the bill at the reference to the Subcommittee on Health.
Notes: Individual Abnormal Returns over time for each Managed Care company listed in the S&P Healthcare Index. We test for abnormal returns between Dec 4 and Dec 8; that includes when the Senate Amendment 2909 was introduced, when it was amalgamated with Senate Amendment 2786, containing the same provisions of the RPSR and part of when it was debated over for the ensuing days whether to attach it to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. We find positive and significant abnormal returns at during this period summing to a culmulative average of 4.2% for each firm. We also observe large positive abnormal returns just following our event window on Dec 10 (of 3.98%), which could arguably be a result of the amendment, given the relative healthcare legislative impasse that week, though we refrain from including it in our tight analysis window. Notes: For each managed care firm in the event study during the introduction of the RPSR Act (May 5-7, 2009), we plot the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns we obtained against the average doctor supply the firm faces in making labor cost decisions. This is done by weighting each state level of the doctor supply per capita by a firm's market cap activity in that particular state. The latter variable is pulled from balance sheet market cap data produced by state managed care subsidiaries which are ranked by market capitalization in the US News and World Report. We leave out United Health because of its complex subsidiary structure and instead add Kaiser Permanente, which is roughly equal in terms of market share. We find a weak, but still significant, negative correlation between CAAR and the number of doctors the firm generally looks at in a labor market setting. This provides evidence for the idea that managed care firms with higher exposure to the doctor shortage, make greater expected strides in labor market cost reduction when there is a federal initiative to increase medical residencies nationwide, and ultimately shrink doctor wages which are farther from equilibirium. 
